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Abstract 
 
In the paper we have clarified how the German multinational (MNE) and small and 
medium sized enterprises (SME) appraise and perform their foreign direct investments in 
Russia. Our analysis was supported by a survey of German firms running their business in 
Russia which was made in the period from April to July 2008. In the survey we also asked 
about the problems and barriers which German companies face when they invest in Russia. 
Finally, we have presented how the ‘typical’ investment decision process is run in German 
firms that are going to Russia. German firms start up their operations in Russia by establishing 
a subsidiary (~80%). All information related to the investment decision is collected mainly 
internally (~80%). 66% of firms appraise foreign investment using the Discounted Cash Flow 
technique which incorporates principally macroeconomic factors, such as the expected inflation 
rate (~70%) and the GDP growth (86%). Institutional factors describing a country’s level of 
corruption, the quality of governance or economic policy and economic structure risks are 
generally ignored. One sixth of firms use these indicators only. The expansion is often financed 
by the parent company (43%) or by German home banks and their Russian subsidiaries. The 
main obstacles while investing are the weak and changing legislation, frequent tax inspections, 
complex tax system and corruption. Undeveloped transport infrastructure belongs to the 
significant barrier as well. However, such factors as language, domestic competition or limited 
access to the strategic important industries are considered as minor hurdles. Besides this, profit 
repatriation restrictions are assessed as a moderate problem. In two thirds of cases the expected 
return on investment has been achieved or even beaten. The key reasons for the failure of 
investment are overoptimistic market expectations, unsatisfactory qualifications of the domestic 
personnel, unreliability of business partners and non-accurate market research.    
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1. Introduction 
 
In the paper we have clarified how the German multinational (MNE) and small and 
medium sized enterprises (SME) appraise and perform their foreign direct investments in 
Russia. Our analysis was supported by a survey of German firms running their business in 
Russia, which was made in the period from April to July 2008. In the survey we also asked 
about the problems and barriers which German firms face when they invest in Russia. The 
questionnaires were sent out mainly to the members of the German-Russian Foreign Trade 
Union (Deutsch-Russische Auslandshandelskammer) and the East Committee of the German 
Economy (Ostauschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft). The response rate amounted to around 20%. 
Four firms said that they had not yet started up in Russia. One company had sold its Russian 
entity to a private-equity firm. Four companies were not able to answer precisely due to the lack 
of time.    
Our paper is structured as follows. In the first chapter we analyze how German firms 
evaluate and perform investments in Russia. The second part is devoted to the analysis of 
problems and obstacles that German firms have when investing in Russia. In conclusion we 
presented how the ‘typical’ investment decision process is run in German firms that are going 
to Russia.   
2. Evaluation of investments 
The expansion to new markets can be one of the suitable strategic options available for a 
growing company. In terms of the ‘eclectic paradigm’ two kinds of resources motivate a 
decision of a company to go abroad: ‘ownership’ advantages (company-specific assets that are 
costly to produce but easy to transfer across national boundaries e.g. R&D, technical and 
managerial know-how) and host-country ‘locational’ advantages (factors that make it profitable 
to operate abroad e.g. market size, lower foreign labour costs, government investment 
incentives and subsidies). Thus, at any given point of time, the level and composite of a firm’s 
foreign activity reflects its strategic response to the ownership specificity (O), locational (L) 
advantages and to the opportunities open to the firm to internalize (I) the market for its 
ownership advantages  (Dunning, 1993). 
There is a wide variety of possible ways of starting foreign activity, ranging from 
exporting to establishing wholly-owned subsidiaries or strategic alliances (licenses, franchises, 
joint venture) which differ in terms of the commitment of the investor’s own resources and the 
risk it is willing to accept and the need to control foreign operations (Douglas and Craig, 1983). 
FDI as an entry strategy is chosen by larger firms that have greater international experience, in 
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regions that are perceived to have high potential (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992). It may take 
the form of wholly or partially-owned subsidiaries or joint ventures. As can be seen from our 
survey, 7% of German firms started up the Russian business in the form of joint ventures, 79% 
- established a wholly-owned or partially-owned subsidiary. Joint venture entry mode would be 
preferred when cultural distance is large between the host and the home countries (Agarwal, 
1994). The probability for forming joint venture is positively related with the level of host 
country welfare, the level of host government restrictions and level of competition in the host 
country (Gomes-Casseres, 1990). As the German and Russian cultures are quite similar, the 
level of competition on the Russian market is still often not so intensive and the Russian 
governmental restrictions are not so tight, the result of our survey (only a 7% share of joint 
ventures in entry modes) is in the line with the theoretical background.     
14% of German MNE and SME entered the Russian market through merger and 
acquisition (M&A) transactions, double as much as established sales representatives. 
When a strategic decision on investing abroad has been made, firms begin to gather 
information relevant to investment appraisal. Near 80% of investors gain information through 
the internal market research, 36% contact the Deutsch-Russische Auslandshandelskammer. The 
table below indicates that the average satisfaction with the internal market research was even 
higher than with that made by an external provider. The least satisfaction was received from the 
Association of German industries (2.7).  
 
Table 1. Ways of information collection and satisfaction level 
Way of information collection % of usage Satisfaction level 
Internally 80% 3.8 
Outsourcing to a Big Four company 21% 3.0 
Outsourcing to a German tax and legal 
advisor (Roedl&Partner, Burkhardt) 
21% 3.7 
Association of German industries (BDI) 21% 2.7 
German-Russian Foreign Trade Union 
(AHK) 
36% 2.8 
Note: satisfaction level scale: 1 – not satisfied, 5 – very satisfied. 
 
The most popular investment appraisal technique among German firms is the Discounted 
Cash Flow approach. Two thirds of firms use this tool. This corresponds to the conclusion of a 
survey by Horvath and Partners Management Consulting (2006) which states that more than 
80% of German companies appraise investments with the help of the Discounted Cash Flows 
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technique or Free Cash Flows technique (Hofmann et al., 2006). Strategic management tools, 
such as the BCG matrix were the next most important investment evaluation practice, ranked by 
17%. One half emphasized the strategic importance of the Russian market as the reason for the 
expansion to Russia.  
Using the DCF assumes the estimation of future cash inflows and outflows in the parent’s 
currency (e.g. EURO) and discounting them by the appropriate cost of equity from the parent’s 
perspective. Country, industry and company-specific risks should be accounted for in the 
relevant cash flows or in the discounting rate. For instance, corruption implies extra costs for a 
firm in the form of bribes, but it may also be cost-reducing, given that bribing leads to 
advantages, such as a preferential tax treatment, reduced costs for licenses and permits or a 
faster handling of bureaucratic procedures (Hakkala, 2005). The recommended treatment for 
allowance for country specific risks is that all factors affecting the amount of future cash flows 
are reflected in the expected values and associated probability distributions of the cash flows to 
be discounted. Uncertainties about cash flows arising from country specific risks should be 
captured in the forecast of Russian roubles cash flows (Armitage, 2005).  
Country specific risks can be assessed through a number of aggregate indicators 
composed by international organisations, such as the World Bank and Transparency 
International. In our survey, the investors were asked for to indicate whether they account for 
the following measures: 
- CPI – Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries in 
terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials 
and politicians. It is a composite index, a poll of polls, drawing on corruption-related 
data from expert and business surveys carried out by a variety of independent and 
reputable institutions; 
- CRS – Economic Intelligence Unit Country Risk Service measures political, economic 
policy and economic structure risks as well as currency, sovereign debt and banking 
sector. It is designed for commercial bankers, institutional investors and corporate 
executives who invest in both emerging and developed markets; 
- KKM - World Bank Kaufmann-Kraay-Mastruzzi Worldwide Governance Indicator 
measures the quality of governance and captures six key dimensions of governance 
(Voice & Accountability, Political Stability and Lack of Violence, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption) for the 
period between 1996 and present. It is based on approximately 40 data sources 
produced by over 30 organizations worldwide. 
Our underlying assumption was that investment climate indicators might affect ‘foreign 
risk premium’. As proposed by Dymsza (1972), investors might construct a composite risk 
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factor reflecting the country investment climate risks based on uncertainty of cash flows and 
then use this factor to discount forecast cash flows. The survey states that only one of six firms 
(16%) involve investment climate indicators when they appraise investment; more than half of 
firms is not familiar with them at all. This result may be due to the fact that firms are not aware 
of the logic behind these indices. In other words, how can the value ‘four’ of CPI Index ranging 
from ‘one’ to ‘ten’ be interpreted in terms of the ‘foreign risk premium’ or incremental cash 
outflows? What does the increase in the CPI from to ‘four’ to ‘five’ mean? Should the discount 
rate be decreased accordingly? There is no commonly recognized methodology to solve this 
problem. That is why it is highly probable that political and regulatory risks are accounted for 
intuitively or emotionally by decision making person. Emotions are intimately linked to 
personal experience, foreign market and language experience, personal interests. Emotions can 
(and sometimes do) influence the perception of investment climate indicators or economic 
measures determining the final investment decision. An example is the valuation of a country 
risk indicator such as CPI which is nominally the same for all decisions makers. Its 
interpretation depends on the emotion of an individual decision maker. What the one decision 
maker who is familiar with the country and its specific business practices and language will 
consider as the moderate level of corruption, might be evaluated ‘very high’ by another (van de 
Laar & de Neuboorg, 2006).           
Hence, it is not fully evident how German firms react and allow for political and 
regulatory risks. A possible scenario was analyzed by Leonhardt (2003), who tested the 
sovereign risk theory of FDI presented in (Schnitzer & Mueller, 2001) and used his survey of 
380 German firms that invested in transition economies from 1989 to 2000 to prove that if 
political risks measured by the State Capture Index rise, the investor will decrease its ownership 
share in the FDI to protect itself against the possible expropriation via taxes by the host country 
government (Schnitzer, Mueller, 2001). 
In the contrast to the institutional indicators, the host country’s macroeconomic measures 
are appreciated. We were interested specifically in the six indicators of the macroeconomic 
environment: expected growth of GDP, inflation rate, creditworthiness, unemployment rate, 
exchange rate and country’s external indebtedness. We found that over 90% of firms keep at 
least one of the above indicators in mind at investment evaluation (86% - GDP, 71% - inflation 
rate; chart 1). It has been expected because these indicators influence forecast cash flows and 
the rate of discount more directly. The creditworthiness of the host country impacts on a foreign 
risk premium. The inflation rate devaluates the real interest rate. The rising external debt ratio 
of a country induces companies to anticipate future tax liabilities to service the debt (Ghura and 
Goodwin, 2000). Fluctuating exchange rate can affect the foreign investment profitability 
estimated from the parent’s point of view. Besides the influence on the future cash flows, such 
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indicators as the expected growth of GDP, inflation and exchange rate might partially determine 
a foreign risk premium as assumed by the macrofactor model (Elton, Gruber and Mei (1994). 
We are, however, of the opinion that the expected inflation rate and the country rating as 
measured by S&P, Fitch or Moody’s are usually the only factors reflected in the discount rate 
applied. All other country’s macroeconomic conditions are captured in the forecast cash inflows 
and outflows. Whereas in measuring political and similar risks the investors rely on the 
‘emotional’ evaluation by investment decision maker rather than on aggregate indicators 
developed by international institutions. 
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Chart 1. Usage of macroeconomic aggregates by German firms at appraising FDI in Russia 
 
Firms that pointed out the usage of DCF or NPV were asked to state the time horizon in 
which future cash flows are usually planned. Answers were divided equally: one half forecasted 
cash flows for the period from one to five years; the other one – for the period from five to ten 
years. It is worth mentioning that under the International Financial Reporting Standards (IAS 
36) for the purposes of the test on goodwill impairment2 it is required to forecast relevant cash 
flows for the period up to five years.     
Financing expansion: basically there are two ways of financing of foreign activity: 
through the internal capital market or external borrowings. 43% of firms cite that their initial 
Russian investments were paid off by German parent companies. 21% of firms borrowed from 
German home banks or their Russian subsidiaries. Around one third of firms left this field 
blank. For the cash management services 30% of firms chose German home banks, 36% - 
                                                        
2 Goodwill is arisen from the purchase of a share in a firm in case the cost of acquisition is more than 
the fair value of net assets bought. Goodwill is recognized as a non-current non-tangible asset and 
should be tested on impairment annually.  
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subsidiaries of German home banks, followed by Russian state-owned banks (14%) or banks 
with the foreign capital (14%).           
         
3. Hurdles of investing in Russia 
Usually firms going abroad seek full-ownership of FDI, no restrictions on profit 
repatriation or capital flow control, protection of technology spillovers and intellectual property 
rights, transparent tax, legal and court system as well as consecutive government policy. In 
Russia, firms face a complex web of legal rules and bureaucratic procedures, all of which have 
the potential to increase costs and risks. We have considered mainly four groups of country 
specific hurdles: political risks, tax system, legal system, infrastructure. 
Companies were asked to rate each hurdle from ‘one’ (‘very significant hurdle’) to ‘five’ 
(‘no hurdle’).  
The most important elements inherent to the political risk are profit repatriation 
restrictions and complete loss of the invested capital due to expropriation as nationalization. 
Unless foreign investors operate in Russia in the so called ‘strategic important industries’ where 
the access of foreign capital is limited, we assess the risk of expropriation or nationalization as 
negligible. So we asked to evaluate repatriation restrictions only. As expected, profit 
repatriation restrictions in Russia are the medium problem for German investors (mean - 3.6). 
As can be seen from the table two, they are more concerned with excessive permissions and 
licenses required to run the Russian business. Slow bureaucracy and non-transparent 
governance are really common hurdles that are pointed out by foreign and domestic investors. 
These shortages are aggravated by bad tax administration, frequent tax inspections (mean: 2.6), 
as well as non-stable legislation (mean: 2.8).              
 
 
Table 2. Hurdles of investing in Russia 
Hurdle Mean Standard deviation 
Language 4.0 0.9 
Limited access to strategic important 
industries 
4.0 1.6 
High level of competition 4.0 0.8 
Profit repatriation restrictions 3.6 1.5 
Excessive permissions and licenses 2.8 1.1 
Lack of good transport infrastructure 2.8 1.8 
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Non-developed banking and payment 
system 
3.8 1.6 
Non-stable and permanent changing law 
system 
2.8 1.1 
Complex tax system 2.6 1.4 
Excessive tax rates 3.1 1.8 
Frequent tax inspections 2.6 1.5 
Corruption 2.8 1.6 
Note: level scale: 1 – very significant hurdle, 2 – significant, 3 - medium, 4 - minor, 5 – no 
hurdle. 
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Chart 2. Ranking of hurdles of investing in Russia 
Note: Square equals to the mean value of a hurdle; the difference between high and low values 
amounts to the standard deviation  
 
 
Although the Russian language is the Slavonic one, language barrier is not a big problem. 
This is remarkable that the domestic competition is not the obstacle for investors as well. It 
demonstrates that companies from Germany have so valuable competitive advantages and 
advanced technologies which allow them to penetrate Russian markets successful, even if 
domestic competitors exist. In fact, in some industries, such as automobile construction, 
machine-building or petrochemical the technology gap is enormous. Accordingly, most Russian 
enterprises are not competitive.         
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Corruption is the element of the host country’s institutional environment that may act to 
deter FDI. As corruption is often treated as a tax, it should be incorporated into the FDI 
decision-making process, e.g. by inclusion in the forecast cash flows or respective discount rate. 
Corruption is considered as a medium hurdle by German investors. This figure can be 
understated as investors might be not fully honest in their answers. The scale of the obstacle is 
as long as for the non-stable legislation, excessive licensing and lack of the reliable transport 
infrastructure. Although in the academic literature Transparency International Corruption 
Perception Index is very popular, as it has been shown above, only 14% of firms take it into 
account in the course of the foreign investment evaluation. The effect of corruption is usually 
accounted for by provisions made for corruption related expenses on the basis of own previous 
experience or estimations.  
Despite all hurdles German firms continue expanding their operations in Russia. From 
2000 to 2005 the total German FDI in Russia increased 4.5 times to €6.8bn, while German 
export to Russia rose 2.6 times to €17.3bn (source: German Central Bank, Deutsche 
Bundesbank). Among the so called BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) countries the level of 
German investments to the Russian economy is compared to Brazil, which is 2.5 times as much 
as to India and only by 40% less than to China. However, it is still low in comparison with the 
United States (30 times less) or neighboring  West European countries (United Kingdom, 
France).  
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Chart 3. Distribution of German firms in accordance with the relation of the actual ROI to ROI 
planned  
 
The further expansion of the current activity of German firms depends partially on their 
being satisfied with previous Russian investments. To measure the satisfaction we were 
interested in: (a) whether an investment decision would be made if it were appraised at present; 
(b) whether the planned return on investment (ROI) had been achieved. 57% of firms stated that 
they would definitely take investment decision again. 28% of firms cited that they would 
probable invest in Russia. The rest of firms was not sure about their behavior. These 57% are 
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well correlated with the share of firms ROI of which was actually achieved or even beaten 
(64%: calculated as the sum of the first three bars on the chart 3). On the other hand, firms 
which did not come up to expectations (36%) were unsure of whether they would invest in 
Russia if they evaluated investment decision at present (36%: the sum of the last two bars).      
Finally, we found out the reasons that, in the opinion of firms, are in charge of investors 
failing to fulfill their goals. The reasons have been ranging from ‘the overoptimistic 
expectations’ to ‘the indiscipline of the personnel’. On the chart 4 possible reasons are shown in 
the ascending order. As can be seen from the chart below, ‘the indiscipline of the personnel’ is 
the least relevant cause, whereas ‘the overoptimistic expectations’ of investors explain the 
failure of their goals the best way.    
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Chart 4. Reasons for the partial failure of investment goals  
Note: 1 – the reason is high relevant; 0 – not relevant at all  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Therefore a typical decision on investing in Russia can be presented as follows: German 
investors start up operations in Russia by establishing a wholly-owned or partially-owned 
subsidiary (~80%). All information relevant to the investment decision is collected mainly 
internally (~80%). A foreign investment is appraised by the Discounted Cash Flow technique 
by 66% of firms. Investment evaluation technique incorporates principally macroeconomic 
factors such as the expected inflation rate (~70%) and the GDP growth (86%). Institutional 
factors describing country’s level of corruption, the quality of governance or economic policy 
and economic structure risks are generally ignored. One sixth of firms use these indicators only 
when they make decision. The expansion is often financed by the parent company (43%) or by 
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German home banks and their Russian subsidiaries. German firms prefer home banks or their 
subsidiaries for the cash services as well. The main hurdles for investing are the weak and 
changing legislation, frequent tax inspections, complex tax system and corruption. 
Undeveloped transport infrastructure belongs to the main barriers as well. However, such 
factors as the language, domestic competition or limited access to the strategic important 
industries are considered as minor hurdles. Besides, profit repatriation restrictions are assessed 
as a moderate problem. In two thirds of cases the expected return on investment is achieved or 
even beaten. The key reasons for the failure of investment consist of overoptimistic market 
expectations, unsatisfactory qualifications of the domestic personnel, unreliability of business 
partners and inaccurate market research.    
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